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The
New American Military Doctrine The impact of 11
September has triggered a series of changes in the way the United States
protects its security and how, to some extent, it will conduct war in
the future. US military
doctrine in the twenty-first century will rely less upon traditional
alliances and the use of overseas bases to project American military
power. American military
doctrine in the twenty-first century evolved out of the strategy of
mutual assured destruction that dominated the Cold War.
Despite the end of the Soviet Union, American military strategy
in the immediate post-cold war period was still based on the concept of
maintaining two massive forces simultaneously.
In other words, the United States military had to be prepared to
advance, defeat and occupy the capitals of two aggressors.
The difficulty with this strategy was that the United States was
only prepared to commit it forces in a major conflict.
Smaller military diversions, in addition to the prospect of
casualties, had the disadvantage of dragging the US into regional
political conflicts. The ghost of Vietnam, in effect, continues to
dominate and influence American military and political thinking. For
example, the use of foreign bases has meant the creation of consensual
regional coalitions and, to a great extent, securing the cooperation of
standing alliances such as NATO as well as the benevolent neutrality of
other major powers. Perhaps,
only in the period right after World War II, did the United States have
the ability to act independently and downplay the susceptibilities of
its allies. Few West German
governments would have considered ignoring the US in the 1950s and 1960s
since their very existence depended on the Americans.
In 1947, the Truman Doctrine extended American military aid and
protection to Greece and Turkey, and both countries had little choice
but to accept the American military umbrella.
Concurrently,
the establishment of US bases in these countries, as well as on the soil
of other American allies, was part of the security measures designed to
safeguard the West from the Soviet Union.
Only the French under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle had the
temerity to snub the US occasionally, but most American allies always
fell in line. In this
context, American bases around the world not only projected US power and
influence but also were exclusively at the disposal of the American
military. Most of the host
countries had also granted the American bases extraterritoriality,
rendering the US troops impervious to local laws. Naturally, this concession as well as the actual presence of
US forces abroad caused considerable resentment.
The
bases, consequently, served as magnets for anti-American activities.
Another liability was that the mere existence of a US base held
the potential of dragging the Americans into local political imbroglios.
More often than not, the presence of a US base provided grist to
the mill of the conspiracy theorist.
It was taken for granted (and still is) that US bases serve as
the mechanism for American political intervention as well as
exploitation of the host country. One
of Osama bin Laden’s major goals is the elimination of the US base in
Saudi Arabia. In one
respect, the 11 September terrorist acts was part of the political fall
generated from the existence of a US base so close to the sacred cities
of Mecca and Medina. In
the decade of the 1970s, the perception was that American influence had
declined. For many, the Iran hostage crisis was the defining moment of
American weakness, while the terrorist bombing of the US marines in
Beirut and their immediate withdrawal underlined US helplessness. The Vietnam debacle also contributed to the limitations of
American power overseas and forced the post Watergate administrations to
downgrade overseas military adventures.
In fact, US power had not so much declined as other states caught
up militarily. At the same
time, America’s allies became sensitive to the use of their territory
by US forces in military operations against nearby states.
Perhaps, the most difficult aspect of the Persian Gulf War was
not so much the actual military operations against Sadam Hussein as were
the politics of coalition building.
Yet that conflict demonstrated the impact of air power.
During
the course of the Vietnam War, the Americans learned the hard way that
mass bombing as well as precision bombing made little impact against an
enemy with limited industrial infrastructure.
In the Persian Gulf War, the United States Air Force and Navy
resurrected the strategy of strategic bombing.
Almost a decade later the bombing campaign against the Serbs
brought the Milosevic Government to its knees exclusively through air
power. During the campaign
the complexities of coalition building forced the Americans to
compromise and adjust their tactics to accommodate their allies.
All
that changed with 11 September. The
US administration had to act and act quickly.
Although the United States had the support of NATO and all of its
allies, the Bush administration could not afford any future compromises
or delays in the war against Afghanistan.
Operations began on 7 October 2001 and the battle was essentially
waged with three to four hundred Special Forces, a couple of thousand
Western ground troops and fifteen thousand Northern Alliance irregulars.
However, the war remained essentially an American affair.
Despite
this, local sensitivities had to be addressed, particularly those of
Pakistan. As a result, the
US had limited access to Pakistani bases as well as those in the Central
Asian republics. The
Americans met the challenge of successfully fighting a war in a remote
and hostile environment without the benefit of major indigenous support.
Their victory resulted from technical superiority and more significantly
through a dramatic change in the their military doctrine.
The war was fought by a combination of precision bombing working
in tandem with small units of Special Forces.
Because the Americans had limited access to land bases, they used
one of their aircraft carriers, the Kitty Hawk, as a floating base and
thus could accommodate 5,000 men and women.
US forces, instead of first establishing a beachhead and then
attacking, were airlifted from their ships directly to the battlefield,
until bases were built in Afghanistan.
Regardless
of what ultimately transpires in Afghanistan, in the short term the US
has successfully waged a battle without the benefit of local military
allies and essentially has proven that US forces are capable of
undertaking military commitments overseas and completing such operations
without the benefit substantial allied support or bases.
In the future, American carrier groups will provide sufficient
firepower, specialized troops and enough airlift capability to intervene
anywhere in the world. Effectively,
the US will be free from maintaining costly overseas bases and the
accompanying political liabilities.
This new American
military doctrine is also compatible with the policy of homeland
defense. The post 11
September world is one of insecurity and ongoing terrorist threats
against American cities and territories. To some degree, the shift to homeland security and
independent military intervention caters to American isolationism.
America’s allies, consequently, will have less influence over
the US in international affairs - with the exception of Canada.
American homeland defense is not possible without securing the
long and un-defended Canadian-US border.
In this new security context, Canadian cooperation and good will
is critical to American security.
The US can choose to abandon NATO as well as bases in the Middle
East or elsewhere; but relations with Canada are dictated by geography. André Gerolymatos
holds the Hellenic Studies Chair at Simon Fraser University and is the
author of The Balkan Wars:
Myth, Reality and the Eternal Conflict |
