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By Prof. Andre Gerolymatos India and Pakistan came close to the edge of the precipice, but at the last minute seem to have back down. The reason why both countries have almost gone to war so many times is Kashmir. Remarkably, the region has no petroleum, gold, silver, uranium and is not straddling any particularly strategic territory. In fact, there is nothing in Kashmir that is the stuff of a cause for war. Yet, the place is vital to India and no less critically important to Pakistan. Historically, the difficulties for the region arose almost from the moment that India and Pakistan gained their independence from Britain. The borders of the new states were artificially created and in 1947 had trapped millions of Muslims and Hindus on the wrong side of their respective countries. The fate of Kashmir was decided by the local Maharaja who threw his lot with India, despite the fact that the majority of Kashmir's population was Muslin and would have felt more at home in the new Pakistani state. However, in 1947-1948, the world was transfixed by the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan as well as by the ensuing slaughter of Muslims and Hindus - the greater tragedy unfolding dwarfed the issue of Kashmir. In 1965 Pakistan launched a full-scale attack against India, while six years later it was the turn of India to go to war. In 1971 the Government of Indira Gandhi took advantage of the unrest that had spread in the eastern region of Pakistan (later to become Bangladesh) and invaded. The Indian armies almost overran western Pakistan and would have completed their conquest had not the United States intervened. President Richard Nixon dispatched the American nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Gulf of Bengal and New Delhi took the hint and withdrew its forces back to Indian territory. At that time American concern was not motivated by a potential nuclear war between the two rivals, rather the Nixon administration had to save Pakistan because that country was America's major ally in South Asia. Although India claimed to be non-aligned, it maintained close ties with Moscow - too close for the liking of the United States. In the shadow boxing of the cold war era Asia was as vital to American interests as Europe. However, in Asia, the United Stated had to compete not only with the Soviet Union, but also with China. That meant turning a blind eye to the transfer of nuclear and missile technology from China to Pakistan. In the meantime, India was able to develop nuclear capability thanks in large part to support from the Soviet Union. Effectively, both India and Pakistan were casualties of the cold war. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could afford to alienate allies or potential allies simply because they wanted to join the nuclear club. By the 1970s both countries had acquired atomic bombs and were quickly developing the requisite delivery systems, which they achieved in the 1990s, to wage nuclear war. Hence we come full circle to the current dilemma. The bone of contention remains Kashmir. The majority of the population remains Muslim and the region has on numerous occasions served as cause for war between India and Pakistan. Pakistan trains and arms thousands of fanatics and ships them to Kashmir where they wage a relentless guerrilla war against the Indian army. Many of these guerrillas also fought for the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan - but the United States must ignore that in order not to alienate the Pakistani Government. In 1998 about 1,000 of these irregular forces infiltrated almost two hundred meters into Indian territory and were finally forced out after almost bringing India and Pakistan to yet another war. Ultimately, a full-scale conflict was avoided but only just. The difference today is that both countries have the capability of incinerating millions of their people in the name of nationalism or religion or both, and Kashmir remains the trigger. In fact, the strategic posture of both countries almost guarantees an all out war. Pakistan claims that possessing nuclear weapons is a deterrent against its more powerful rival. Indeed, the Indian army is over twice the size of the Pakistani and this applies to the number of warplanes, tanks and artillery. In a conventional military conflict, regardless how effective the Pakistani forces are, India will eventually defeat Pakistan. In such a case, the Pakistanis will be forced to use nuclear weapons to stop an Indian invasion. Accordingly, Pakistani nuclear deterrence supposed to forestall such a turn of events. However, India's nuclear program was created, according to the Indian Government, to counter Pakistan's nuclear threat. In other words, Pakistan will not retaliate if defeated because India also has atomic weapons. Yet, neither of these nuclear deterrence options is realistic. It is highly unlikely that India, regardless of the provocation, will be able to conquer Pakistan. The United States will not stand by in such a scenario and China and even Russia will be forced to intervene. Consequently, the nuclear option for India and Pakistan is a more realistic military alternative. There are millions of people in Pakistan and India who on more than one occasion have raised their voices in favor of war. Indeed, they have not called for limited conflict or punitive action but all out war. They protest in the streets and demand the complete destruction of the other side. Under these circumstances, and with such powerful sentiments expressed by ordinary people it is hard to imagine that either a Pakistani or Indian government would accept a military setback. During the cold war deterrence worked because fundamentally neither the United States nor the Soviet Union as well as their citizens were willing to risk a nuclear holocaust. In any given crisis, Washington and Moscow contemplated a nuclear exchange only after exhausting all policy alternatives and for the most part assumed that nuclear war would result accidentally. For India and Pakistan the nuclear scenario may be the first and only option as a consequence of total war. Andre Gerolymatos holds the Hellenic Studies Chair at Simon Fraser University and is the author of the Balkan Wars: Conquest, Revolution and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond, published by Basic Books.
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